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Abstract
Zeno's paradoxes of motion, which claim that moving from one point
to another cannot be accomplished in nite time, seem to be of serious
concern when moving towards an agreement is concerned. Parkinson's
Law of Triviality implies that such an agreement cannot be reached in
nite time. By explicitly modeling dynamic processes of reaching interim
agreements and using arguments similar to Zeno's, we show that if utilities
are von Neumann-Morgenstern, then no such process can bring about
an agreement in nite time in linear bargaining problems. To extend
this result for all bargaining problems, we characterize a particular path
illustrated by Raia (1953), and show that no agreement is reached along
this path in nite time.
1 Introduction
1.1 Paradoxes of motion
Zeno of Elea, a philosopher of the 5th century BC, is known for four arguments
showing that motion is illusory, or at least demonstrating that motion cannot
explain the displacement of bodies in space. The second, and the most famous
one is the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, which claims that after giving a
head start to the tortoise, Achilles can never reach the tortoise. Summarized in
Aristotle's Physics, VI, 9, the argument amounts to saying:
In a race, the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since
the pursuer must rst reach the point whence the pursued started,
so that the slower must always hold a lead.
The rst argument, or paradox, (Aristotle, Physics, VI, 9), is even simpler, it
... asserts the non-existence of motion on the ground that that which
is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives
at the goal.
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Had Zeno lived in our happier times, or had he been interested in social
interactions rather than physics, he would have concluded, in the same spirit,
that moving towards an agreement is impossible, or at least that such motion
can never terminate, as \that which is in locomotion towards an agreement
must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal", paraphrasing
Aristotle's words. Thus, if Achilles and the tortoise are moving towards an
agreement on how to split a drachma, they need to agree rst on how to divide
half of it but then they face a similar division problem of the remaining half.
Thus, Zeno could conclude that moving towards an agreement can never end.
1.2 Zeno meets Parkinson
Trying to refute Zeno's arguments, Aristotle noted that after arriving at half
the way, the problem of reaching the goal is similar to the original one, but
not the same. The distances in Zeno's paradoxes become ever shorter, and
likewise the time intervals required to pass them. With modern understanding
of innite sums we can complete Aristotle's argument by showing that the sum
of the said time intervals converges. But can we make the same argument in the
case of moving towards an agreement? Do the time intervals required to agree
on smaller amounts also diminish, not to speak their sum converging? Here
experience seems to indicate just the opposite. The celebrated Parkinson's Law
of Triviality, which refers to decisions made by committees, states
The time spent on any item of the agenda will be in inverse propor-
tion to the sum involved. (Parkinson (1957), Chapter 3.)
In the example that illustrates this undisputed law, Parkinson describes a com-
mittee that spends two and a half minutes on a decision to spend $10,000,000
on the construction of an Atomic Reactor, forty ve minutes on the decision on
the material to be used for a bike shed costing $2350, and nally, an hour and
a quarter on refreshment supplies worth $57 annually.
We can conclude from this law that a committee that allocates a certain
amount of money in a gradual process will never completely achieve its goal, as
described above in the bargaining between Achilles and the tortoise. Parkinson,
being aware of the possibility of never ending deliberations, concludes that there
is a small amount of money over which people lose interest, and conjectures that
the point of vanishing interest is the amount people subscribe to charity. Here we
analyze a stylized model where there is no point of losing interest, or, adopting
Parkinson's conjecture, we study homo economicus, the self-interest motivated
agent who never donates money to charity, by denition. We claim that for such
agents, there is good theoretical support for the application of Zeno's argument
to motion towards an agreement.
1.3 Moving in utility space
Parkinson explains his Law of Triviality by deep epistemological insights. A
more direct explanation, which we try to advance here, would be to deny the
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distinction between trivial and big issues. Our starting point for this argument
is the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) theory of utility and the bargaining
theory developed by Nash (1950), based on this type of utility. Moving towards
an agreement means, in such a theory, reaching some interim agreements on
utility vectors ut1 , ut2 and ut3 at times t1, t2 and t3, where t3 > t2 > t1, and
ut1 > ut2 > ut3 . Assuming that the the interim agreement reached in the rst
time interval is more important than the one reached in the second means that
ut2   ut1 > ut3   ut2 . Should we expect more time to be spent on the \bigger"
issue, that is, should t2  t1 > t3  t2 hold? We keep in mind the pitfall against
which Luce and Raia (1957) cautioned us in what they call Fallacy 3: It is
meaningless to say that since ut2   ut1 > ut3   ut2 , moving from ut1 to ut2 is
preferred to moving from ut2 to ut3 . But if such a preference is meaningless
why should times spent deliberating these movements be dierent?
1.4 Bargaining forever
We claim that while Zeno's paradox of motion in physical space does not repre-
sent a real pehnomenon, it is alive and kicking when bargainers move in the space
of vNM utility vectors. To show this we use Nash's model of bargaining, but our
solution to Nash's bargaining problem is a dynamic process rather than a spec-
ication of a Pareto agreement. More specically, we introduce path-solutions
that assign to each problem a time-parameterized path of interim agreements.
We start our study of path-solutions by assuming two simple axioms. First,
we require that the path reects restarting of bargaining at each moment of
time. Second, since we assume vNM utility functions, which are dened up to
positive ane transformations of individuals' utility function, we want the path-
solution to be covariant under such transformations. These two requirements
are enough to guarantee that such a path-solution|achieving continuously new
interim agreements|can never reach in nite time a full-blown agreement on
the Pareto frontier for bargaining problems with linear Pareto frontier.
The argument is simple. By the continuity assumption, there exists some
time at which the bargainers reach a new interim agreement which is not on
the Pareto frontier. By the rst assumption on a path-solution, this interim
agreement serves as a new status quo point for further bargaining. But due
to the linearity, the new problem looks exactly as the original problem save
re-scaling which by the second property of a path-solution is immaterial. Thus,
it should take the bargainers the same time to reach the frontier from the new
status quo point as it took them when they started. This is impossible, unless
the frontier is never reached.
This reects the same intuition as in Zeno's rst argument. After arriving
half the way, one faces the same problem, namely, to pass the remaining way.
For physical distance the argument is awed, because the remaining problem
is not the same as the rst one, as the remaining distance is shorter than the
original one. But for moving in vNM utility space, the remaining problems is
indeed the same as the original one, because there is are no shorter distances,
as distances are dened up to multiplication by positive constant.
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To reach the conclusion that the Pareto frontier is not reached for general
problems, we assume more axioms on the path-solution. These axioms imply
that the path-solution is the one described by Raia (1953). We show that
this path solution fails to reach an agreement in nite time for any bargaining
problem.
1.5 And in reality?
We do not study here empirical evidence on the theoretical claims we make. We
note however, that international relationships provide a plethora of examples
of bargaining, which may serve as test cases. In many conicts an agreement
is achieved directly, without going through a sequence of interim agreements.
Yet some international conicts are marked by a bargaining dynamics in which
interim agreements are reached sequentially.
One example is the dozen of treaties reached in the last fty years, mostly
between the US and the USSR, over control and reduction of nuclear armaments.
The most famous of these are the SALT I and II treaties and more recently the
START treaty.
In this example one can argue that the Pareto frontier is not well dened.
That is, it is not clear what the possible nal agreements are. But in the Israeli-
Palestinian conict it is quite obvious what constitutes a nal agreement. This
conict is managed through what is almost ocially called the \peace process"
(Quandt (2005)). Since 1993, several interim agreements have been reached,
yet an agreement, namely a peace treaty between the parties, seems to be as
far in the future as it was more than twenty ve years ago when the process
started. Of course, the political situation is complicated, but one wonders what
is the causal relationship; does the complexity of the conict require a gradual
process of interim agreements, or does this type of process prevent the reaching
of a solution of the conict, as indicated by the theoretical results here.
1.6 Related work
The dynamic aspects of bargaining has been dealt with in several works, starting
with an axiom of step-by-step negotiation in Kalai (1977). Later work empha-
sized axioms that involve the change of disagreement point while keeping the
bargaining set xed (Thomson (1987), Peters and van Damme (1993), Livne
(1989), Anbarci and Sun (2009)). But none of these works introduced time
explicitly into the theory. The image of the Raia path for two players was
axiomatize by Livne (1989) and Peters and van Damme (1993). This image
is described by a dierential equation that relates the change of utility of one
player in terms of the utility of the other player. Thus, the dynamic, temporal
aspect of the path is not expressed is these works. A time parameterized path
of interim agreements is described in O'Neill et al. (2004), but bargaining is
described there by a continuum of Pareto frontiers rather then one bargaining
problem.
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The discrete Raia solution is characterized axiomatically in Anbarci and
Sun (2009). In Diskin et al. (2010), a family of discrete generalized Raia
solutions is axiomatized. Moreover, in this work the Raia time parameterized
solution was introduced and has been shown to be the limit of the discrete
solutions in this family.
2 Bargaining dynamics
Bargaining theory suggests various types of agreements for bargaining problems
of n players. More specically, the theory considers a family B of bargaining
problems (S; d), where S  Rn is a set of utility vectors and d is a status quo,
or a disagreement point in S. It then looks for a solution function , which
assigns to each problem (S; d) an agreement| a Pareto point, (S; d) in S.
Here we are interested in dynamic processes of bargaining. Thus, we are
looking for a path-solution function  which assigns to each problem (S; d) a
time parameterized path,  = (S; d), in S. More specically, (t) is a function
dened for t  0, the values of which are in S, and (0) = d. We think of (t)
as an interim agreement achieved at time t, which serves as the status quo point
for further bargaining.
The paths  and ^ are similar if each is obtained from the other by linearly
speeding up or slowing down. That is, if there exists c > 0 such that ^(t) =
(ct). Two solutions  and ^ are similar, if there exists c > 0 such that for
each (S; d), ^(S; d)(t) = (S; d)(ct) for all t.
We say that the path  does not reach an agreement if for all t, (t) is not
Pareto. Obviously, any path which is similar to such a path  has the same
property.
We say that a solution  is continuous (dierentiable) if for each problem
(S; d) in B the path (S; d) is continuous (dierentiable).1
2.1 Bargaining forever: the linear case
A bargaining problem (S; d) is linear if there is a > 0 in Rn, such that S = fx 2
Rn j ax  1g and ad < 1. The linear bargaining problem (S0; 0), where S0 is
dened by a = (1; : : : ; 1) and d = 0 is the division of a drachma problem.
To show that an agreement is never reached in linear problems we need only
two axioms. The rst states that the path (S; d) means that bargaining restarts
every moment. That is, the interim agreement reached at time t, (S; d)(t), is
the status quo point from which the bargaining process restarts.
Axiom 1 (Restarting)
Let d0 = (S; d)(t). Then (S; d0)(t0) = (S; d)(t+ t0).
The second axiom reects the assumption that the utility of each player is
given by a vNM utility function, and therefore it is determined up to a positive
1Only derivative from the right is required at t = 0.
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ane transformation. Thus, the path should be covariant with respect to such
transformations to which we refer, in the sequel, as utility re-scaling.
Axiom 2 (Scale covariance)
If a; b 2 Rn, a > 0 and (x) = (aixi + bi)i2N , then ((S); (d)) = ((S; d)).
Theorem 1 Suppose that B contains all linear problems. If  is a continuous
solution that satises axioms 1 and 2, then for each linear problem (S; d), (S; d)
does not reach an agreement.
2.2 How slowly is an agreement approached?
We now give an explicit expression of path solutions for the division of the
drachma problem when axioms 1 and 2 are satised. For simplicity we assume
symmetry. A point, set, or path in Rn are symmetric if they are invariant under
permutations of coordinates.
Axiom 3 (Symmetry)
If S and d are symmetric, then (S; d) is also symmetric.
We also assume that the players improve upon their initial status quo point.
This is expressed in the next axiom.
Axiom 4 (Individual rationality)
For t > 0, (S; d)(t)  d, and if d is not Pareto, then (S; d)(t) 6= d .
Observe, that if  satises the axioms of individual rationality and restarting,
then for any t0 > t, (S; d)(t0)  (S; d)(t), and if (S; d)(t) is not Pareto, then
(S; d)(t0) 6= (S; d)(t).
Theorem 2 Suppose that B contains all linear problems, and let (S0; 0) be the
division of the drachma problem. If  is a continuous solution that satises
axioms 1-4, then (S0; 0) is similar to the path  which satises for each i,
i(t) = (1=n)[1  e t]:
The explicit formula in Theorem 2 demonstrates the claim of Theorem 1:
since 1   e ct < 1 for each t, the path does not have any Pareto point on it.
Yet, the path converges at innity to a Pareto agreement.2
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Theorem 2, for the division of a drachma
problem (S0; 0), limt!1(S0; 0)(t) = (1=n; : : : ; 1=n).
2Axiom 4 is not essential for Theorem 2. The theorem holds without this axiom if we allow
the constant c to be negativ. But for Corollary 1, axiom 4 is required. Without it, the path
can get further away from the Pareto frontier as t!1.
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The proof of Theorem 1 hinges on the fact that changing the status quo
point in the interior of a linear problem results in a linear problem and that
all linear problems are the \same" in the sense that they can be transformed
into each other by re-scaling of utility. This echoes Zeno's rst argument: After
making a certain way towards an agreement we face exactly the same problem
and therefore it is impossible to reach an agreement in nite time.
Such an argument cannot be used for non-linear problems, and indeed the
theorem does not hold in general unless we assume some restrictions on the
path, which we do next.
2.3 Bargaining forever on the Raia path-solution
We dene the Raia path for general bargaining problems and show that agree-
ment is never reached on this path. The path computed in Theorem 2 for the
division of the drachma problem is a special case of the Raia path. In order
to dene the Raia path, we rst describe the set B in detail.
A pair (S; d) is in B, if S is closed, convex, comprehensive3, and positively
bounded.4 In addition we require that all the boundary points of S are Pareto.
For each problem (S; d) the function mi(S; d) = maxfxi j (xi; d i) 2 Sg is
well dened, and obviously, m(S; d)  d. The Utopia point for a bargaining
problem (S; d) is m(S; d) = (mi(S; d))i2N .
Denition 1 The Raia path-solution, R, assigns to each problem (S; d) the
path  = R(S; d) dened by the dierential equation
(1) 0(t) = m(S; (t))  (t);
with the initial condition (0) = d. Thus, starting in d at time 0, the path moves
at each point of time towards the Utopia point.
It is shown in Diskin et al. (2010) that for each problem (S; d) 2 B this dif-
ferential equation has a unique solution, and it converges to a Pareto point of
S.
Let ^(t) = (1=n)[1  e nt] be a path similar to the solution for the division
of the drachma problem, (S0; 0), in Theorem 2. Then for each i, ^0i(t) = 1  
n^i(t) = 1  (n  1)^i(t)  ^i(t). Since 1  (n  1)^i(t) = mi(S0; ^(t)), ^ is the
Raia path solution of the division of the drachma problem. As the right hand
side of the dierential equation (1) is covariant with utility re-scaling, it follows
that if  is a dierentiable path solution that satises axioms 1-4, then there
exists c > 0 such that for each linear problem (S; d), (S; d)(t) = R(S; d)(ct).
The Raia path-solution which extends the solution of linear problems to
all problems, also suers from the deciency of not being able to bring the
bargainers to an agreement.
Theorem 3 The Raia path-solution of any problem does not reach an agree-
ment.
3That is, for each x 2 S, fy j y  xg  S.
4That is, there exists a > 0 in Rn and a constant , such that bx   for each x 2 S.
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2.4 Axiomatizing the Raia path-solution
By adding two axioms to the previous ones, we can characterize the family of
solutions that are similar to the Raia path-solution. The rst requires that the
larger the bargain set is, the higher that bargainers aspire to.
Axiom 5 (Monontonicity)
If (S; d) and (T; d) are two problems in B such that S  T , then 0(T; d)(0) 
0(S; d)(0).
The next axiom says that the only part of the bargaining problem which
is relevant to the determination of the path is the set of individually rational
outcomes.
Axiom 6 (Relevance)
If (S; d) and (T; d) are two problems in B such that fx j x 2 S; x  dg = fx j
x 2 T; x  dg, then (S; d) = (T; d).
Theorem 4 If  is a dierentiable path-solution that satises axioms 1-6, then
it is similar to the Raia path-solution R.
3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. By the scale covariance axiom it is enough to prove
the claim for the division of drachma problem (S; 0). Let  = (S; 0). Suppose
that the set ft j (t) is Paretog is not empty. By the continuity of  it has a
minimal point T which is the rst time the path reaches the Pareto frontier of
S. Since (0) = 0, T > 0. Choose t, 0 < t < T , and let d0 = (t). The problem
(S; 0) can be transformed by re-scaling into the problem (S; d0). Therefore, by
the scale covariance axiom the path  is transformed by the same function into
(S; d0). In particular, T is also the rst time the path (S; d0) reaches the
Pareto frontier of S. But this is contradicted by the restarting axiom, since
(S; d0)(T   t) = (t+ (T   t)) = (T ) which is Pareto, and T   t < T .
Proof of Theorem 2. Let  = (S0; 0) be a path that satises the conditions
in the theorem. By the symmetry there exists a real valued function f(t), such
that i(t) = f(t) for each i. Fix t and let d0 = (t). Then, d0i = f(t). The trans-
formations (1  nf(t))xi + f(t) transform the problem (S0; 0) into the problem
(S0; d0). Hence, by axiom 2,  = (S0; 0) is transformed by these transforma-
tions into (S0; d0). Thus, for any t0, i(S0; d0)(t0) = [1   nf(t)]f(t0) + f(t) =
f(t) + f(t0)   nf(t)f(t0). By axiom 1, i(S0; d0)(t0) = f(t + t0). We conclude
that for each non-negative t and t0,
(2) f(t+ t0) = f(t) + f(t0)  nf(t)f(t0)
By Theorem 1, for each t  0, f(t) < 1=n. By the axiom of individual
rationality for each t > 0, f(t) > 0. Thus, for each t > 0, 0 < 1   nf(t) < 1.
8
Hence, the function g(t) = ln[1 nf(t)] is well dened, continuous, and for each
t > 0, g(t) < 0. It is easy to check that by (2), for each t > 0 and t0 > 0,
g(t+ t0) = g(t)+ g(t0). The continuity of g implies that there is c > 0 such that
g(t) =  ct. Thus, f(t) = (1=n)[1  e ct], and  is similar to the path described
in the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (S; 0) be a problem for which mi(S; 0) = 1 for
each i, and let  = R(S; 0). Then, for each t such that (t) 2 S, (t) =R t
0
m(S; ())  ()d . Then, for jj  jj, the L1 norm in Rn,
jj(t)jj = jj
Z t
0
m(S; ())  ()d jj 
Z t
0
jjm(S; ())  ()jjd:
By the axioms of individual rationality and restarting, for each t, (t)  0.
By the comprehensiveness of S, m(S; (t))  m(S; 0). Thus, m(S; ())  
()  m(S; 0)   (0). We conclude that the integrand in the above integral
satises jjm(S; ())   ()jj  jjm(S; 0)   (0)jj = jj(1; : : : ; 1)jj = n. Hence,
t  jj(t)jj=n.
Suppose that for some t, (t) is Pareto, and T is the rst time this happens.
Note, that m(S; (T )) = (T ). Else, for some i, mi(S; (T )) > i(T ), contrary
to (T ) being Pareto. Observe also that the simplex|the convex hull of the
unit vectors in Rn|is contained in S. This shows that jj(T )jj  1, because
otherwise, m(S; (T )) 6= (T ). Thus T  1=n. Since every problem (S; d) can
be transformed by utility re-scaling into a problem of the type now discussed,
it follows that for any problem (S; d), the rst time T that R(S; d) is Pareto
must be at least 1=n.
Suppose now that T is the rst time that R(S; d) is Pareto. Let t = T  
1=(2n) and d0 = R(S; d)(t). By the axiom of restarting, R(S; d0)(1=(2n)) =
R(S; d)(t+ 1=(2n)) = R(S; d)(T ). Thus, R(S; d0) reaches a Pareto point in
a time which is less then 1=n, contrary to what we have proved. This shows
that a Raia path can never reach a Pareto point.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose  is a dierentiable path-solution that satises
axioms 1-6. We have shown that for the split the drachma problem, (S0; 0),
there exists c > 0 such that (S0; 0)(t) = R(S0; 0)(ct). Since, m(S; x)   x is
covariant under utility re-scaling, it follows that for each linear problem (S; d),
(S; d)(t) = R(S; d)(ct). For a general problems (S; d) we x i and dene two
problems, (S ; d) and (S+; d) such that S   S  S+.
The problem (S+; d) is a linear problem and therefore, as we have shown,
0(S+; d)(0) = c(R)0(S+; d)(0): By the monotonicity axiom 0(S; d)(0) 
c(R)0(S+; d)(0).
The problem (S ; d) agrees with a linear problem on the set of individu-
ally rational points, and thus 0(S ; d)(0) = c(R)0(S ; d)(0) by the relevance
axiom. By monotonicity, 0(S; d)(0)  c(R)0(S ; d)(0).
Finally, the problems are constructed such that
(Ri )
0(S ; d)(0) = (Ri )
0(S+; d)(0) = c(Ri )
0(S; d)(0):
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Thus we conclude that 0i(S; d)(0) = c(
R
i )
0(S; d)(0). Since this is true for each
i, it follows that 0(S; d)(0) = c(R)0(S; d)(0).
The details of the construction of S+ and S  are in the proof of Theorem 1
in Diskin et al. (2010). For t > 0, let d0 = (S; d)(t). Then, by the restarting
axiom, 0(S; d)(t) = 0(S; d0)(0) = c(R)0(S; d0)(0) = c(R)0(S; d)(t):
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